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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent: 
D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company. 
The Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner: 
SunCrest, LLC, formerly known as DAE/WESTBROOK, 
L.L.C, a Delaware limited liability company, DRAPER 
CITY, a municipal corporation; JOHN DOES 1 to 15 
The parties to the proceeding in the Fourth District Court are: 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant: DJ Investment Group, L.L.C. 
Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Third Party Plaintiff: SunCrest, L.L.C. 
Third-Party Defendants: David Mast, Judith Mast, and U.S. General, Inc. 
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JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction^]"2 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although Appellant has listed what it terms to be the issues presented for review, the 
issues before the Court were framed by the Supreme Court itself. In an Order dated August 
29, 2005, the Supreme Court limited the issue before it to the following: 
1. "Whether the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the standard governing 
a motion to disqualify under rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by weighing the 
hardship to the client against the prejudice suffered by the opposing party." Sp. Ct. Order, 
ibid. 
Although this is stated by Appellants in their brief as the issue, they stray from this 
limited issue into other side-issues in their brief. To the extent they stray from this single 
issue, their Opening Brief should be stricken. 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended). 
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"Where courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual disputes, and the quantity 
of less tangible factors implicating the trial court's decision is large, a trial court is naturally 
in a better position to consider and weigh all those circumstances in their application of the 
legal standard at issue.? Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998) 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-56 (Utah 1994)). The trial court's ruling 
incorporates both questions of fact and law, and thus we apply an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1995) (where the trial 
court's findings involve "mixed questions of fact and law .. . The proper standard of review 
.. . is the abuse of discretion standard"). 
Defendant argues that the standard of review should be a de novo review, however, 
it is asking the Court to review the "balancing", (or from Defendant's point of view, the 
alleged lack of balancing), that is required by Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. The very balancing Defendant seeks to review, requires a review of the factual 
circumstances of the case as well as the application of the law. Therefore, the abuse of 
discretion standard is more properly applied in this appeal. 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Rule 3.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. That rules states: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is 
likely to be a necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal 
services rendered in the case; or 
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(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial 
hardship on the client. 
b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in 
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from 
doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
SunCrest appeals the Court of Appeals' affirmation of a decision made by Judge 
Lynn Davis in the Fourth District Court in Provo, in a case that has been litigated now for 
nearly five years and which continues to be before the Fourth District Court. Currently, 
Judge Derek Pullan presides in that matter. Judge Pullan recently indicated that the size of 
the file had grown to 18 volumes and reaches over four feet in height. Trial is tentatively 
scheduled to proceed in January of the upcoming year, less than two months away. 
Although, in fairness, it is likely to be continued to some later date. 
The decision of Judge Davis was to deny Westbrook's (who have recently changed 
their name to SunCrest) request that DJI's counsel, Mr. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. be 
disqualified as counsel although they allege he is a "necessary witness." As explained by 
Judge Davis, not only is Mr. Snuffer not a necessary witness, even if he were, the exceptions 
in Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility apply in this case. (R. 2454-2446). 
DJI initiated this action in May of 2001. (R. 2453). After almost three years of 
litigation, Westbrook filed a tactical motion to disqualify DJFs counsel. It was not meant 
to advance this matter, rather it was an attempt to delay, an approach Westbrook has 
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continually employed in this matter. This step is no different. All of the tactical delay is 
meant to capitalize upon the duration of time they, as developers, can keep Plaintiff's 
property from being developed through this litigation. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
On November 16,2000, the parties entered into an agreement. See R. 2453. On May 
7, 2001, now more than 4 years ago, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of that agreement and 
began this litigation. Id., see also R. 162-1. After considerable discovery, on December 20, 
2002, D.J. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it is abundantly clear Plaintiff 
sought recovery for material misrepresentations made by Defendants in negotiating the 
agreement. Id., see also R. 1058-951. On January 28,2003, Westbrook filed its Opposition 
to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Rule 56(f) continuance. Id., see 
also R. 1153-1082. The Court granted them additional months of discovery before they 
were required to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
After eight additional months of discovery, on August 7, 2003, Westbrook filed its 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see also R. 1676-1356. On 
August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see also R. 1926-1693. On August 27, 2003, 
the lower Court heard arguments on D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see 
also R.1927. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the 
parties'agreement. R. 2452, 2001-1996. 
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On February 19,2004, 3 Vi years after the agreement was signed, 3 years after the suit 
was initiated, more than a year after Plaintiff had filed it's summary judgment motion, 6 
months after Westbrook had filed it's own reply, 6 months after the Court heard arguments 
on the motion, and more than 3 months after the Court made it's decision on the motion, 
Westbrook moved to disqualify Mr. Snuffer. R. 2452. That motion was denied by the lower 
Court. R. 2454-2446. Westbrook sought an interlocutory appeal of that denial. R. 2484. 
The Appeals Court affirmed Judge Davis' decision (see Exhibit A), and this Court has now 
granted certiorari to review both of those Court's decisions. 
Throughout Defendants have argued Mr. Snuffer is a necessary witness as was their 
own counsel, Baird & Jones. However, discovery of Baird & Jones' information and 
materials have been resisted throughout the course of the proceedings below, and they have 
not produced a single document nor answered a single question. Consistently they have 
repulsed any discovery regarding their files or information. Baird's files were withheld 
because of a claimed "privilege" and Judge Pullan sustained that objection. SunCrest then 
designated Bruce Baird as their 30(b)(6) witness, even though he departed Phoenix before 
the final agreement was settled and signed in Phoenix. This designation of Baird was again 
a ploy. Even when DJ Investments wanted to ask questions about correspondence between 
Baird and Micron prior to any lawsuit being filed (there is a case between Micron and 
SunCrest) it was Baird's position that such materials were undiscoverable and privileged. 
When it was challenged, Judge Pullan upheld the claim of privilege and so Mr. Baird's 
materials have also been undiscoverable. 
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Facts established in the Record below: 
In Westbrook's prior motion, before the Court of Appeals, and in their current brief, 
Westbrook relies upon deposition testimony of Dave Mast, Robert Christiansen, and Jeff 
Anderson as support for their allegation that Mr. Snuffer will become a necessary witness. 
As was shown in the record below, the testimony used by Westbrook is taken out of context 
and extrapolated to create a contrived support for their motion and for this current appeal. 
First, Westbrook claims the record shows Mr. Snuffer negotiated nearly every 
sentence of the initial agreement. (See SunCrest's Brief, p. 7). This is not true. Mr. Mast 
stated in his deposition he, Mr. Snuffer, and Bob Christiansen were involved in negotiating 
the contract, but qualified that statement by saying Mr. Snuffer "wasn't participating in the 
entire negotiations" and that he "did not author the settlement agreement language." See R. 
2172. Further, Westbrook cites the deposition of Robert Christiansen during which 
Mr. Christiansen states Mr. Snuffer was involved on "our side." He does not however at any 
point state Mr. Snuffer negotiated nor authored any portion of the agreement. Westbrook 
states it is Mr. Christiansen's testimony that Mr. Snuffer "collaborated" with Bruce R. Baird 
and Michael F. Jones on drafts of the settlement agreement. This was not what Mr. 
Christiansen's testimony said. In fact, those are the words of the Defendant's attorney 
taking the deposition. See 2164. To be fair, Mr. Christiansen did say Mr. Snuffer was 
involved, but he further qualified that by testifying Mr. Snuffer was not at all involved in 
the drafting and negotiating in Phoenix where the final agreement was reached. Id. Mr. 
Christiansen's testimony refers to conversations and email exchanges between Mr. Snuffer 
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and his clients. Id. The allegations set forth by Westbrook are completely without basis or 
foundation. 
Westbrook alleges the agreement, was drafted in an "all night negotiating session." 
(See Westbrook's Brief, p. 5). This again is not true. DJI does not deny there was at least 
one occasion in which the parties met to negotiate the terms of the agreement. (R. 2222-
2220, 2164). And, Mr. Snuffer did attend one of those sessions in his office. Id. However, 
Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones, who were also in attendance, during that session, never let Mr. 
Snuffer exercise any physical control over the draft document. Id. In fact, Mr. Baird and 
Mr. Jones maintained the document on their disk and completed all the typing. Any 
language proposed by Mr. Mast was rewritten and reworded by Mr. Baird and/or Mr. Jones 
into language they agreed upon. Id. Furthermore, the agreement was substantially 
completed before that session by Westbrook's attorneys, and fully and finally completed in 
a three day negotiating session in Phoenix, Arizona, when Mr. Snuffer was NOT in 
attendance. Id. 
In fact, the final agreement was put together in Phoenix, with Bruce Baird, Ed 
Grampp, David Mast and Robert Christiansen over the course of three day's worth of 
meetings. See R. 2171. Westbrook contends only minor changes were made in Phoenix, 
but that again is not true. The very clause which is at controversy in this matter (Paragraph 
14) was negotiated then. See R. 2171-2169. The minor changes to the agreement have 
been the subject of almost 5 full years of litigation, comprise 18 volumes of Court files, 
which reach almost 4 feet in height. To assert the changes were minor is ridiculous given 
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the position SunCrest has taken throughout the years of litigation. In fact, the very 
paragraph which has become critical to this dispute, paragraph 14, was not even included 
in the initial agreement, it was only added to the actual agreement after three full days of 
negotiation and presentation of assurances by Westbrook's attorneys and representatives in 
Phoenix. Id. During that time Mr. Snuffer was in Salt Lake City, and did not participate in 
the creation of the final documents, nor in the final execution of the agreement. Id. The 
final executed documents were not even shown Mr. Snuffer until April of the year 
following, six months later. Id., see also R. 2262-13; see also R. 2225-22234. ALL of the 
closing documents' notary attestations are from Phoenix, where the closing took place. Id. 
Although Mr. Mast and Mr. Christiansen were in Phoenix (along with Mr. Baird and Mr. 
Grampp of DAE/Westbrook), Mr. Snuffer was not in Phoenix and did not attend the 
closing. R. 2222-2220. 
The only involvement Mr. Snuffer had with any of the negotiations or drafting of the 
agreement was mere "word smithing." Id. The actual terms of the agreement were all 
negotiated and determined by Plaintiffs President, Mr. Mast, and Vice-President, Mr. 
Christiansen, the parties who actually had authority. Id. Mr. Snuffer's testimony will not 
be helpful in this matter, and will run afoul of attorney-client privilege. Id. 
3
 Which is a copy of the cover letter and attachments sent in April, 2001, in which 
Mr. Snuffer finally received a copy of the final documents from DAE/Westbrook. 
4
 Which is a copy of another delivery of the Special Warranty Deed signed at 
closing, also sent in April, 2001 to Mr. Snuffer from Terrabrook. 
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Westbrook relies upon testimony of Jeff Anderson for the assertion that Mr. Snuffer 
discussed the Micron easements with him. See Westbrook Brief at p. 9. The testimony of 
Jeff Anderson was that he discussed that issue with Mr. Mast and Mr. Snuffer. See R. 2159. 
It never states that only Mr. Snuffer discussed that matter with Mr. Anderson, in fact, when 
Defendant's counsel questioned as to what Mr. Snuffer specifically discussed with him, Mr. 
Anderson's answer referred to "they" or Mr. Mast and Mr. Snuffer, not Mr. Snuffer in 
particular. Id. Mr. Mast was always the principle in any such conversation. Further, Mr. 
Snuffer has no recollection of any such conversation. Therefore, his testimony will be he 
can't recall any such discussion. Testimony of that nature does not require him to be called 
as a "necessary witness" in this proceeding and is certainly no basis for disqualifying him. 
Westbrook's recitation of the facts attempts to exaggerate the importance of a meeting 
held in Mr. Snuffer's office one evening with Mr. Christiansen and the drafters of the 
agreement. (See Appellant Brief p.6-9). At the same time, they attempt to depreciate the 
four-day negotiation that took place in Phoenix, Arizona, at which Mr. Snuffer was not in 
attendance. (See Appellant Brief, p. 6-9). Mr. Mast, Mr. Grampp (DAE/Westbrook) and 
Mr. Baird (counsel for DAE/Westbrook) began to meet in Phoenix on Monday, November 
13th. (R. 2412, 2398). Mr. Christiansen joined them on Wednesday, November 15th. The 
contract closed on November 16th. R. 2222-2220, see also R. 2262-1; see also R. 2225-
2223. On November 16th Mr. Snuffer was not only not in Phoenix on the 16thR. 2222-2220. 
Therefore throughout the time when the final negotiations were taking place, Mr. Snuffer 
was occupied with other matters involving other responsibilities and clients. Mr. Snuffer 
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should not be found to be a necessary witness in a case where he was not even in attendance 
at the most crucial and determinate parts of the finalization of the agreement at issue. 
Mr. Snuffer wrote a letter in October, 2000 asking about information about the 
easement over which a road was to be built for DJI's benefit. The letter uses the term "we." 
That term refers to a contact between Mr. Robert Christiansen for DJI and Micron's 
representative. The letter asks for information about an easement across Micron's property. 
In response, when in Phoenix, the SunCrest representatives came to Phoenix the next month 
and brought with them copies of the engineered road design plans, the $8.55 million bond 
guaranteeing construction of the road and the Development Agreement between SunCrest 
and Draper City showing the contractual obligation to build that road adjacent to DJI's 
property. Mr. Mast was satisfied with this new documentation and paragraph 14 was added 
and the agreement signed. SunCrest has argued Mr. Snuffer's October, 2000 letter also was 
a reason to depose him. After the Court of Appeals matter was pending, SunCrest filed 
another motion to depose Mr. Snuffer just a few months ago. However, Judge Pullan 
considered their arguments about the October, 2000 letter and found that it was Mr. 
Christiansen, not Mr. Snuffer, who contacted Micron and therefore the deposition of Mr. 
Snuffer was unnecessary. (A copy of this additional relevant ruling is attached as an exhibit 
to this brief.) Further, SunCrest has been aware of this letter for over five years. There was 
never any effort to depose Mr. Snuffer on the matter, and indeed no questions asked about 
the letter in any timely discovery. To seek to disqualify counsel at this late date on such an 
irrelevant point is unwarranted. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
As Defendant state, "The heart of the underlying litigation is a dispute over the 
interpretation of a single paragraph in an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant." 
See Appellant Brief, p. 11. In order to resolve certain disputes between these parties, 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into some negotiations. Some preliminary negotiations 
took place in Mr. Snuffer's presence. After those preliminary negotiations, an initial 
agreement was drafted, which did not contain the paragraph 14 referred to by defendant 
as the "heart of the ... dispute." Paragraph 14 was added only after three full days of 
negotiation and meetings held in Phoenix, Arizona, in which Mr. Snuffer was never 
present. Mr. Snuffer cannot be a necessary witness to something he did not even 
participate in. 
Furthermore, Defendant's motion to disqualify was not filed "shortly" after the 
Court ruled paragraph 14 should be subject to parol evidence. Rather, it was filed more 
than three months after that decision came down. It was further filed more than six 
months after oral arguments were heard on the motion for summary judgment in which 
the issue was raised, and years after the case had been initiated. Part of the reason the 
trial Court denied the motion was the untimeliness of it's presentation. The Court of 
Appeals recognized this untimeliness in their affirmation. 
Furthermore, it is clear that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals balanced 
the interests of both sides of this dispute in making their decisions. This was done in 
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compliance with Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and the decision of 
each should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Like the Previous Motion and Appeal, This Petition is a Tactical Ploy 
that Should Not be Rewarded. 
In DJI's Opposition to DAE/Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify, DJI argued that 
"[w]henever an opposing party attempts to disqualify the attorney for the party adverse to 
him, the Court's sensitivity to a tactical ploy should be raised." See R. 2273. The same 
holds true for this instance. The Rules of Professional Conduct are not intended to be used 
as advocacy tools in litigation. They are intended to govern an attorney's professional 
conduct. The Rules of Professional Conduct caution us in this regard and provide the 
following statement in the Preamble to the Rules: 
'The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not 
designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as 
procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-
assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a 
disciplinary authority does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral 
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of that Rule. 
Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should be deemed to augment any 
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of 
violating such a duty." 
(Emphasis added.) Westbrook used this procedural/tactical "weapon" below in the trial 
court, in the Court of Appeals, and now attempts to use it again. It is improper and 
disqualification should not be granted in this case. 
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II. The Trial Court Correctly Found and the Court of Appeals Correctly 
Affirmed that Mr. Snuffer Should Not be Disqualified Pursuant to Rule 
3.7 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. 
Defendant argues Mr. Snuffer and his law firm should be disqualified to act as 
counsel for the Plaintiff in this matter. As support for that assertion, Defendant relies upon 
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct which states: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is 
likely to be a necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal 
services rendered in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial 
hardship on the client. (Emphasis added.) 
Not only is Mr. Snuffer not a necessary witness, nor likely to act as a witness in this matter, 
as the trial court found and the Court of Appeals affirmed, the exceptions in this rule would 
apply to Mr. Snuffer and any potential testimony he might possibly give. 
"In determining whether to disqualify counsel, the trial court must recognize a 
presumption in favor of [a party's] counsel of choice." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 
164 (1988). Furthermore, adverse counsel should not be called as a witness to offer 
insignificant testimony or as a ruse to disqualify counsel. See, e.g., State v. Worthen, 765 
P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988). The drafters of the ABA Code, upon which the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct were modeled, have cautioned that the ethical rules "[were] not 
designed to permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as a witness and thereby disqualify him 
as counsel." ABA Code, Canon 5, n. 31; accord Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d763, 766 
(3d Cir. 1975). "The cost and inconvenience to clients and the judicial system from misuse 
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of the rules for tactical purposes is significant." See Brown & Brown, Disqualification of 
the Testifying Advocate—A Fzrm7?w^? 57 N.C.L.Rev. 595,619-21 (1979). Because of this 
potential for abuse, disqualification motions should be subjected to "particularly strict 
judicial scrutiny." Optyl Eyewear Fashion v. Style Companies, 760 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 
1985) (citing Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Freeman 
v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co.y 689 F.2d 715, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
Defendant's entire purpose for the original motion, and subsequent appeals is not 
legitimate. Rather, they are meant to be used for tactical purposes, and to prejudice Plaintiff 
in terms of time, expense, and frustration. Where the party seeking disqualification is also 
the one wanting to call the attorney as a witness, the court "must be especially sensitive to 
the potential for abuse." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Frazier, 637 F. Supp. 77, 86 (D.Kan. 
1986). 
A. The Lower Courts Properly Balanced the Interests of Both Parties. 
SunCrest's main contention in this appeal is the mistaken belief that neither the trial 
court nor the Court of Appeals properly balanced the interests of both parties, as is required 
by Rule 3.7. The belief is mistaken and the very opinions provided by those courts belies 
such a claim. 
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer will not be 
disqualified where "[disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on 
the client." Ut. R. Prof. Conduct. R. 3.7. The comment to that rule further requires a 
14 
balancing between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Id. Comment 
At the time of the decision, Comment 4 to Rule 3.7 stated: 
"4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a 
balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the 
opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice 
depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the 
lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict 
with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in 
determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be 
given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that 
one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably 
be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10 has 
no application to this aspect of the problem." 
The balancing mentioned in the comment, relied upon by Defendant, also requires the Court 
to give due regard to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client, even if there is risk 
of prejudice to the opposing party. It also requires the court to consider whether or not the 
party requesting the disqualification could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would 
probably be a witness. Each of these balancing factors was clearly reviewed by the trial 
court and incorporated into it's final decision. 
To balance the interests the Court must look at whether or not the hardship that would 
occur to the party whose attorney is disqualified outweighs the granting of the motion, or 
vice versa. The exception to the rule is created to avoid disqualifying a party representative 
when that disqualification creates too great a hardship. It does not work the other way as 
suggested by Westbrook. 
15 
The lower court found disqualifying Snuffer at this stage of the litigation would cause 
substantial hardship to D.J. See Memorandum at p. 5, R. 2450. Additionally the court 
found it would result in financial and tactical prejudice against D J. Id. at p. 7, R. 2448. 
Those were the same issues again reviewed by the Court of Appeals. D.J. Investment 
Group, LLC v. DAE/Westbrook, LLC, Case No 20040340-CA, 2005 UT App 207 (May 5, 
2005), attached as Exhibit 1 to the Appendix hereto. It was this hardship that both courts 
found outweighed any prejudice potentially suffered by SunCrest. 
Furthermore, SunCrest cannot argue its hardships were not considered. The lower 
court in its decision repeats first '"a balancing is required between the interests of the client 
and those of the opposing party.'" See Memorandum Decision, p. 5 (citing Utah Rules of 
Prof 1 Conduct, R. 3.7, Comment), R. 2450. Judge Davis proceeds then to state "[t]his 
Court, after the weighing the [sic] interests of the parties, finds that disqualifying Snuffer 
at this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial hardship to D.J." Id. The lower 
court very clearly indicates not only did it recognize the requirement to weigh the interests, 
but also that it had weighed the interests of both parties. 
The Court of Appeals similarly recognized the requirement (see f 4) and specifically 
commented that "the trial court weighed the interests of the parties!".!" D.J. Investment 
Group, LLC, 2005 UT App. f 4. What Defendant perhaps wishes this Court to forget, is that 
there was a hearing on this matter at the trial court level. That each side had opportunity to 
present, not just by memoranda, but also in court, their arguments. As the Court can readily 
see, SunCrest presented much argument supported by depositions, letters, and other 
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evidence. All of this was necessarily weighed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals, then 
was asked to determine if the proper balancing had been performed. Id. The trial court 
weighed the interests of both parties. That is what is reflected by the ruling by the trial court 
and affirmation by the Court of Appeals. Just because SunCrest does not agree with the 
Court's determination, does not mean it is wrong. It is not an abuse of discretion for the 
lower court to make such a finding, nor was it an abuse of discretion for the Court of 
Appeals to affirm that decision, and that finding should not be reversed now. 
B. The Court Factored All Aspects Required by the Rule, Including 
Timeliness. 
Rule 3.7 further requires the court factor in other aspects into their determination, 
including whether or not the filing was timely. SunCrest, completely ignores the fact that 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that SunCrest's filing of the Motion 
to Disqualify was untimely. Id. That, is a required factor to be considered in the balancing 
required by Comment 4 of Rule 3.7, and it too, was correctly factored into the denial of the 
motion. 
In Zions National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 (Utah 1989), 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately 
filed and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for 
disqualification." This is the standard that the trial court relied upon. In that case, the filing 
of a motion to disqualify three months after the discovery that the lawyer might be necessary 
was too long to wait. Id. In this case, the trial court recognized that it had been three 
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months since the ruling regarding the use of parol evidence was made, but that SunCrest 
reasonably should have recognized the issue even at the very initiation of the lawsuit 4 years 
ago. 
The trial court stated that it "must examine the entire procedural history to determine 
timeliness." See R. 2448. Further, the lower court stated that "[o]ne can argue very 
persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of the filing of the lawsuit that the 
alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the court's interpretation 
of the language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties knew Mr. Snuffer 
participated in that settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: May 7, 2001)" Id. 
at 7. The court further intimated that because of the collateral documents presented with 
DJFs summary judgment memorandum in December of 2002, and the arguments made at 
hearing on August 27,2003, that Westbrook should have known at that time that there might 
be a potential for disqualification. See Memorandum Decision, p. 7, R. 2448. As SunCrest 
acknowledges, a Motion to Disqualify should be brought at the earliest moment. Here the 
lower court found that the earliest moment might have been even at the very instigation of 
litigation in 2001. Or if not then, certainly by December, 2002, when DJI filed its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Or if not then, certainly by August, 2003 when oral arguments were 
finally heard on DJFs Motion for Summary Judgment. Those were the reasons the court 
based in making a finding of untimeliness. That was factored into the trial court's decision, 
as required by Comment 4 of Rule 3.7, and it was also recognized by the Court of Appeals. 
See DJ. Investment Group, LLC, 2005 UT App. 207. 
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The Court of Appeals recognized that "the parties were aware that Snuffer would 
likely be a necessary witness at least three months prior to filing their motion, if not earlier." 
See D.J. Investment Group, LLC, 2005 UT App. f 6. In footnote, the Court of Appeals 
further indicated that both parties were aware of Snuffer's participation in the settlement 
agreement at the time the underlying lawsuit was filed. See Id., footnote 4. And that the 
parties had even further indications at the time Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed. Id. 
There are issues regarding an interpretation of the agreement which have been known 
since the very beginning of this litigation. If, as SunCrest now claims, Mr. Snuffer was so 
intricately involved with the process of drafting the settlement documents, it was done with 
SunCrest's attorneys. Mr. Snuffer's involvement, no matter what it actually was, was known 
from the beginning, and this type of motion should have been brought at the beginning, as 
was correctly held by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Instead, SunCrest has 
waited until the matter is almost concluded and the parties are readying themselves for trial. 
It is used only as a tactical ploy. At this point, trial is scheduled for January, 2006, less than 
two months away. Discovery has ended. There are now more than 18 volumes of court 
pleadings on file with the trial court, which reach almost 4 feet in height. If the 
disqualification of Mr. Snuffer was prejudicial a year and a half ago, when the Court 
recognized the vast amount of work that had already been the prejudice that would occur if 
Mr. Snuffer were disqualified at this point is exponentially greater. Although Plaintiff 
disagrees that Defendant's appeal has any legal merit, even assuming arguendo that it did, 
19 
the real effect of reversing the Court of Appeal's affirmance does nothing but amplify the 
actual prejudicial burden that would be felt by DJ. 
C. Any Prejudice SunCrest Might Suffer is Minimal. 
There is not one piece of evidence nor one word of testimony Mr. Snuffer could give 
that would not be cumulative of the testimony that would be offered by either Mr. Mast or 
Mr. Christiansen or some other witness. In every instance in which there was an oral 
communication between any party with regard to the settlement agreement, Mr. Snuffer was 
always accompanied by Mr. Mast or Mr. Christiansen. Further, in all communications he 
was acting in conformity with instructions of Mr. Mast or Mr. Christiansen, who directed 
all negotiations and who reached all agreements. Mr. Snuffer did nothing independent of 
his role as an attorney for Mr. Mast's company. In all of those instances, Mr. Snuffer never 
acted as a principle, nor negotiated any portion of the settlement agreement. Throughout 
those negotiations, he acted as an advisor to his client making all of his communications 
with them protected by the attorney client privilege and inadmissible as evidence. His ability 
to testify being limited by the rules of privilege not only excludes him from acting as a 
witness in this matter but also eliminates the basis for this petition. 
SunCrest attempts to make hay of the extremely improbable and unrealistic scenario 
of Mr. Snuffer being examined as a witness in this case. He is not a necessary witness, and 
should not even be placed on the stand. A lawyer is a "necessary" witness "if his or her 
testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v. 
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Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297,1302 (D.Colo. 1994). In that case, the lawyer who was 
ultimately disqualified, was the sole negotiator, executor, and administrator of the contract, 
which made him the key witness in both situations. See World Youth at 1302. Mr. Snuffer 
was not the sole negotiator, in fact as Mr. Mast testified in his deposition, his role was 
relatively small in any negotiations. See Depo of Mr. Mast at p. 76, see R. 2172. Mr. 
Snuffer did not draft the document, that was accomplished by Bruce Baird and Michael F. 
Jones. Mr. Snuffer has not administered any portion of the agreement, in fact there was little 
time to administer the agreement as Defendants almost immediately breached that 
agreement. In fact, Mr. Snuffer not only did not administer the agreement, he didn't see the 
final signed agreement for over six months after it was finalized. Mr. Snuffer was not as 
involved as Defendants claim. To observe the negotiations and review drafts does not make 
him a necessary witness. American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 634 F. 
Supp. 112,122 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Similarly, a lawyer who merely observed the negotiations 
and reviewed draft agreements need not be disqualified."). See also Paretti v. Cavalier 
Label Co., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 985, 986 (S.D.N.Y, 1989) (The court found in Paretti that the 
attorney was not a necessary witness as his recollection of the meeting did not conflict with 
that of movant's corporate counsel; as his involvement in drawing up early drafts of 
agreements was not important because they were redrafted; as it was not shown any of the 
key terms were actually written by that attorney and, therefore, reflect his understanding of 
the transaction; and as to any ambiguous terms the testimony of the parties concerning their 
intent was the best evidence). In this case, the very "heart" of this litigation, by SunCrest's 
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denomination, is a paragraph that was not included in any agreement Mr. Snuffer ever had 
any part in. 
Moreover, any testimony Mr. Snuffer could offer is obtainable from various other 
sources including Mr. Mast, Mr. Christiansen, Mr. Baird, Mr. Jones, Mr. Anderson, Mr. 
Grampp, and a variety of other persons who were directly involved in the creation of the 
settlement agreement, and even more specifically, the very paragraph 14 that has become 
central to this litigation. Most of these other individuals were in attendance at the three day 
meeting in Phoenix where the terms of the agreement were actually finalized and agreed 
upon. Mr. Snuffer was not at that final meeting. The fact that he communicated to his client 
by phone, email, or even fax, does not make him a witness. "[I]f the evidence sought to be 
elicited from the attorney-witness can be produced in some other effective way, it may be 
that the attorney is not necessary as a witness." Humphrey on behalf of State v. McLaren, 
402 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn. 1987). "If the lawyer's testimony is merely cumulative, or 
quite peripheral. . . ordinarily the lawyer is not a necessary witness." Id. "Simply to assert 
that the attorney will be called as a witness, a too-frequent trial tactic, is not enough." Id. 
In the cited testimony of Mr. Christiansen (on page 34 of the Christiansen deposition 
transcript, R. 2162) Mr. Christiansen declined to make Mr. Snuffer a party to paragraph 14 
discussions. He testified it was he (Mr. Christiansen) who satisfied himself, through 
discussions with Mr. Baird representing DAE/Westbrook paragraph 14 granted access to the 
Alpine Highway. He testified that this understanding was "critical" to bringing the property 
into development. Nothing is said about Mr. Snuffer's involvement with that discussion. 
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Although Mr. Baird as counsel for DAE/Westbrook interjected himself into the 
negotiation process in a way to make him a necessary witness (as Defendants have 
acknowledged), Mr. Snuffer did not. Mr. Baird was the lead negotiator and had sole 
involvement at times. Mr. Snuffer was neither the lead negotiator nor was there any time 
when he was the sole party involved. Defendants have argued that Mr. Baird is a necessary 
witness5, which Plaintiff has not disputed. However, Plaintiffs have always maintained, and 
now two courts have agreed, that Mr. Snuffer is not similarly situated and his involvement 
was tangential to the process. 
In essence, Mr. Snuffer's testimony is unnecessary. Furthermore, it cannot go to the 
issues which are at the very "heart" of this dispute. It cannot disadvantage SunCrest. This 
was appropriately weighed by the trial court, and examined by the Court of Appeals. Those 
courts did not fail to consider the burdens that SunCrest might potentially face, rather it 
carefully weighed those in contrast with the actual burdens DJ will face, in addition to the 
timeliness of the motion and the other factors the court relied upon. 
D. There Will Be No Burden on the Tribunal. 
Defendant argues that the tribunal will be burdened by Mr. Snuffer acting as a 
witness. First, that is not a factor required to be considered in the balancing requirement of 
Comment 4, as it read at the time of the Motion. Though that has now been amended in the 
5Despite this, Mr. Baird has refused to produce documents and resisted discovery aimed 
at him. Motions to compel and for protective orders have been necessary and continue to be 
argued below, and still nothing has been produced from Mr. Baird. So it seems that his status as 
"necessary witness" may be a convenient tactical argument for purposes of attempting to 
disqualify Mr. Snuffer rather than a real acknowledgment which Defendants intend to act upon. 
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current version of the comment, it was not a part of the version a year and a half ago when 
the motion was filed, and should not be considered at this time. 
Secondly, the Court should recognize that there has been a substantial amount of 
discovery accomplished in this case. There are at least 20 witnesses that will participate in 
the trial of this matter. Mr. Snuffer, even if he actually is called to be one of those witnesses, 
cannot be a significant one. The suggestion that Mr. Snuffer will have to "hop off the stand 
for each question posed on behalf of his client" or "to object from the witness box, or step 
down and do this" is a silly proposition and devalues the time, effort, and import of the 
issues before this Court or before the trial court on that very matter. 
SunCrest lastly recognizes the significant hardship that would occur Plaintiff if the 
Defendant's motion was granted today. It argues that in contrast, the hardship must have 
been lesser at the time Defendant's motion was actually granted. While that may be true, 
that does not reduce, or even speak to the gravity of the burden that would have been 
suffered at the time of the trial court's decision. That the hardship on Plaintiff would be 
greater at this point than it would have been only 3 years into the litigation is a moot point. 
The trial court decidedly weighed the burden disqualification would have on DJ, stating that 
at that time, disqualification would require DJ to expend an exorbitant amount of time and 
money. See Rec. 2449. That the hardship would be greater now should not give this Court 
pause to believe that the decisions made by the trial court or the Court of Appeals were 
wrong. They were not, and they should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests this Court affirm the 
decisions of the Fourth District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals not to disqualify 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. from continuing as counsel for Plaintiff and Appellee in this case. 





FER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Bn-dfiFer, Jr. 
i
 Ajppellee f# 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLEE DJ. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C.'S OPENING BRIEF, via first class 
mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Richard W. Casey (0590) 
John H. Bogart (8305) 
Evelyn J. Furse (8952) 
Nicole A. Skolout (10223) 
HOWREY, LLP 
170 South Main St., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
on this / h day of November, 2005. 
25 
APPENDIX 
1. D.J. Investment Group, LLC v. DAEAVestbrook, LLC, Case No 20040340-
CA, 2005 UT App. 207 (May 5, 2005). 
2. Ruling on DAEAVestbrook L.L.C.'s Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, 
Jr. And Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C., Decision by Judge Lynn W. 
Davis of the Fourth Judicial District Court, entered June 9, 2004. 
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
1l Appellant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. (Westbrook)1 argues that the 
trial court erred by denying its Motion to Disqualify Denver C. 
Snuffer Jr. and the law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, 
P.C. (collectively Snuffer). We affirm. 
^2 On November 16, 2000, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement, which dismissed D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C.'s (D.J.) 
lawsuit against Westbrook. Snuffer, attorney for D.J., was 
involved in the negotiations leading to the settlement agreement. 
On May 7, 2001, D.J. rescinded the settlement agreement and filed 
suit against Westbrook. Nearly three years later, Westbrook 
filed a Motion to Disqualify Snuffer, relying primarily on Utah 
1. Since filing its Motion to Disqualify, Westbrook has changed 
its name to SunCrest, L.L.C. EXHIBIT 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. The trial court denied the 
Motion to Disqualify, and Westbrook subsequently filed this 
interlocutory appeal . 
^3 The standard of review generally for decisions relating to 
disqualification is abuse of discretion, unless the court is 
called upon to resolve solely a legal or ethical issue. See 
Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998) 
(holding that because no issues of fact were presented to the 
trial court, "to the extent this [c]ourt has a special interest 
in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a 
trial court's discretion is limited"). In contrast, "[w]here 
courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual disputes, and 
the quantity of less tangible factors implicating the trial 
court's decision is large, a trial court is naturally in a better 
position to consider and weigh all those circumstances in their 
application to the legal standard at issue." Id. (citing State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). The trial court's 
ruling incorporates both questions of fact and law, and thus we 
apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Margulies v. 
Unchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1995) (where the trial 
court's findings involve "mixed questions of fact and law . . . . 
the proper standard of review . . . is the abuse of discretion 
standard"). 
^4 Westbrook argues that the trial court erred by finding that 
Snuffer's disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
D.J. and by not balancing the interests of the parties.2 
According to rule 3.7, "[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a 
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness 
except where . . . [d]isqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client." Utah R. Prof.'1 Conduct 
3.7(a) (emphasis added). In determining whether an attorney 
should be disqualified on the grounds contemplated by rule 3.7, 
the trial court is required to balance the client's interests 
with those of the opposing party. See Utah R. Proff1 Conduct 3.7 
2. Westbrook also argues that the trial court erred by failing 
to determine whether Snuffer was a necessary witness. However, 
it was not essential that the trial court determine whether 
Snuffer was a "necessary witness" under rule 3.7 of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct because, even if it had, the 
hardship exception would have compelled the same result: 
Snuffer's disqualification would force undue hardship upon D.J. 
cmt. However, even if there is risk of prejudice to the opposing 
party, "due regard must be given to the effect of 
disqualification on the lawyer's client." Id. (emphasis added).3 
^5 Here, the trial court weighed the interests of the parties 
and found that D.J. would face substantial hardship in both time 
and money if forced to hire new counsel at such a late stage of 
discovery. Specifically, the court noted that 
[t]he case at bar was filed in May of 2001, 
almost three years ago, and since that time 
the parties have vigorously litigated an 
extraordinary number of legal issues. The 
[c]ourt also notes that the parties have 
conducted a significant amount of discovery 
in connection with this litigation. Most, if 
not all, of the key witnesses have been 
deposed and written discovery has been sent 
out and answered by both parties. All things 
considered, the parties have engaged in a 
substantial amount of work. Indeed, the 
[c]ourt file now fills seven exceptionally 
thick folders and addresses some very complex 
legal issues. The [c]lerk of the [c]ourt has 
just opened the eighth file. Under these 
circumstances, the [c]ourt doubts another 
attorney could be brought up to speed in this 
matter and recognizes that such an effort 
would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant 
amount of time and money. 
3. When issues of professional discretion arise, the Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct call for self-governance. In particular, 
the rules state, 
Violation of a [r]ule should not give rise to 
a cause of action, nor should it create any 
presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached. The [r]ules are designed to 
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through 
disciplinary agencies. They are not designed 
to be a basis for civil liability. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the [r]ules can 
be subverted when they are invoked by 
opposing parties as procedural weapons. 
Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct Scope. 
[^6 The trial court also found that Westbrook filed its motion 
in an untimely manner. We agree. A motion to disqualify counsel 
is untimely when it is not "immediately filed and diligently 
pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for 
disqualification." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 480-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(emphasis added) (holding that the defendants' motion to 
disqualify counsel was untimely because it was filed three months 
after it learned of the representation, and one day before the 
opponent's motion to compel settlement was scheduled for 
hearing). Here the parties were aware that Snuffer would likely 
be a necessary witness at least three months prior to filing 
their motion, if not earlier.4 Thus, had Westbrook timely filed 
its motion, it could have significantly reduced D.J.'s costs of 
retaining and bringing new counsel up to speed. 
[^7 Because D.J. would face substantial hardship if forced to 
retain new counsel at this late stage and Westbrook's motion to 
disqualify Snuffer was untimely, we hold that the trial court 
properly denied Westbrook's motion. Accordingly, we affirm. 
Gu*&^ m. lll&^/) 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
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Russell W. Be 
Associate 
G^-^ory K. Orme, Judge 
4. At the time the underlying lawsuit was filed, both parties 
were aware of Snuffer's participation in the settlement 
agreement. Likewise, the parties were aware of Snuffer's 
participation from the arguments presented for and against D.J.rs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, even if Westbrook did not 
believe that Snuffer was a necessary witness until the trial 
court indicated parole evidence would be taken in regard to the 
settlement agreement, Westbrook failed to file its Motion to 
Discaialifv until three months later. 
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DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
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Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer 
Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen. Oral arguments were held on April 7,2004. Richard 
Casey appeared on behalf of DAE/Westbrook ("Westbrook") and Denver Snuffer appeared on 
behalf of D.J. Investment Group ("D.J."). The Court having heard oral arguments and carefully 
considered the Motions and Memoranda of the Parties now makes the following ruling. 
I. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY & RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. In October 2000 Westbrook entered D.J.'s property and began building a roadway in order to 
conform with city regulations that required communities of 20+ dwellings to have more than one 
road leading to and from the community. 
2. D.J. filed a lawsuit in the 4th District Court to abate what it considered to be a trespass on the 
part of Westbrook and also sued for damages. 
3. On November 16, 2000 in Phoenix, Arizona, the parties created a multifaceted agreement 
containing, among other things, provisions dismissing D.J.'s lawsuit and allowing Westbrook to 
continue using the access road on D.J.'s property. Denver Snuffer ("Snuffer"), D.J.'s attorney, 
participated, either directly or indirectly, in the negotiation the agreement. 
4. Provision 14 of the agreement allowed D.J. the use of a not-yet-created "Southerly Roadway" 
that would be located on Micron property abutting D.J.'s property. The original route 
contemplated would give D.J. access to State Road 92 by way of this "Southerly Road." 
5. Despite Westbrook's representations that it had secured the necessary easements to construct 
the Southerly Roadway, the rights to these easements may not have been obtained and Westbrook 
is now preparing to build the Southerly Highway along a different route that does not provide D.J. 
with any access to State Road 92. On May 7, 2001, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of the 
settlement agreement and began this current litigation. 
6. On June 8, 2001, Westbrook filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint. 
7. On December 20, 2002, D.J. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8. Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28, 2003. 
9. D.J. filed its Reply to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
February 5,2003. 
10. On August 7, 2003, Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
11. On August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
12. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
August 27, 2003. Richard Casey appeared on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared 
on behalf of D.J. At the conclusion of Oral Arguments the Court took the matter under 
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advisement. 
13. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the November 16, 2000 
settlement agreement. The corresponding Order denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was signed and filed on January 7, 2004. 
14. On February 19, 2004, Westbrook filed a Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
15. On February 25, 2004, D.J. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to 
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
16. After being granted additional time to respond to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to 
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C, Westbrook filed its 
Reply to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on March 17, 2004. 
17. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. 
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on April 7, 2004. Richard Casey appeared 
on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared on behalf of D.J. 
18. Denver Snuffer has served as D.J.'s counsel in the case at bar from the inception of the 
original litigation to the present time. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Westbrook contends this Court should disqualify Snuffer in the case at bar because 
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this litigation violates Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct. D.J. argues this Court should not disqualify Snuffer because Snuffer is not 
a necessary witness in the case at bar and disqualifying Snuffer at this point in the litigation would 
inflict substantial hardship on D.J. Although Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in the case 
at bar may implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, this Court declines to 
disqualify Snuffer because Westbrook's request is untimely and would inflict significant hardship 
on D.J. 
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A. SNUFFER'S ACTIONS IN THE CASE AT BAR IMPLICATE RULE 3.7 
Westbrook alleges that Snuffer's representation of D.J. in the case at bar violates Rule 3.7 
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.7 provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered 
in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the 
client. 
UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7. The Utah Supreme Court addressed the prohibition 
against serving as counsel and witness and indicated that M[i]f an attorney attempts to combine the 
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both as 
advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question." State v. Leonard, 
707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985). The Leonard Court also indicated that "application of this rule 
does not depend on whether an attorney will be called but. . . on whether he 'ought to be called as 
a witness' in the underlying action." Id. 
D.J. notes that Rule 3.7 only applies when an attorney is a necessary witness during the 
trial. Snuffer, D.J. contends, is not a necessary witness and therefore should not be disqualified. A 
lawyer is generally only considered a necessary witness "if his or her testimony is relevant, material 
and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 
(D. Colo. 1994). Furthermore, Utah courts have indicated that disqualification of a lawyer may 
not be necessary if his or her testimony only relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues. Leonard, 
707 P.2d at 653. 
The factual disputes between the parties make it difficult for the Court to make a 
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conclusive determination as to whether Snuffer was sufficiently involved in the settlement 
negotiations to warrant his designation as a "necessary'" witness in the case at bar. Although 
Westbrook and D.J. provide very different renditions of Snuffer's role in the negotiations leading 
up to the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement, both accounts demonstrate that Snuffer was 
present during many of the negotiation sessions and advised David Mast and Robert Christensen 
on matters related to such settlement negotiations. While Snuffer's involvement may have 
rendered him a "necessary" witness in the case at bar, this Court holds that it does not need to 
reach such a determination because the facts of this litigation give rise to the "special 
circumstances" exception contemplated in Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
B. DISQUALIFYING SNUFFER WOULD "WORK SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP" ON D.J. 
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct will not prevent a lawyer from 
advocating at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness if "[djisqualification of 
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client." UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
3.7. In order to determine whether a client will suffer a "substantial hardship," "a balancing is 
required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." UTAH RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7, Comment. 
This Court, after the weighing the interests of the parties, finds that disqualifying Snuffer at 
this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial hardship to D.J. The case at bar was filed in 
May of 2001, almost three years ago, and since that time the parties have vigorously litigated an 
extraordinary number of legal issues. The Court also notes that the parties have conducted a 
significant amount of discovery in connection with this litigation. Most, if not all, of the key 
witnesses have been deposed and written discovery has been sent out and answered by both 
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parties. All things considered, the parties have engaged in a substantial amount of work. Indeed, 
the Court file now fills seven exceptionally thick folders and addresses some very complex legal 
issues. The Clerk of the Court has just opened the eighth file. Under these circumstances, the 
Court doubts another attorney could be brought up to speed in this matter and recognizes that 
such an effort would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant amount of time and money. 
Furthermore, this Court believes that Westbrook could have significantly reduced the costs 
of bringing new counsel up to speed if Westbrook had filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver 
Snuffer in a more timely fashion. In Zion 's First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately filed 
and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification." 
In Jensen,iht Utah Court of Appeals held that Jensen's Motion to Disqualify Counsel was 
untimely because it was filed more than seven months after counsel's first appearance and more 
than three months after Jensen became aware of the potential conflict. In contrast to Jensen, 
Westbrook's own pleadings intimate that Westbrook has "reasonably foreseen," since the initiation 
of this litigation, that Snuffer might be called as a witness in the case at bar. 
Westbrook argues that Snuffer only became a "necessary" witness in this litigation at the 
time the Court indicated that it would accept parole evidence regarding the settlement agreement. 
Even if Westbrook's argument is accepted as true this Court can still find Westbrook's filing was 
untimely. Westbrook filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer on February 19, 2004, roughly 
three months after the Court's November 17, 2003 decision to accept parole evidence on the 
settlement agreement at issue. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals held Jensen's Motion to 
Disqualify Counsel was untimely because it was filed "more than three months" after Jensen 
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became aware of the potential conflict." Jensen 781 P.2d at 481. Similarly, this Court could find 
that Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer was untimely because it was filed more 
than three months after Westbrook became aware of the Court's decision to accept parole 
evidence regarding the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement. 
But the Court must examine the entire procedural history to determine timeliness. One can 
argue very persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of the filing of the lawsuit that the 
alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the court's interpretation of the 
language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties knew Mr. Snuffer participated in that 
settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: May 7, 2001) 
More importantly at the time of the filing of Summary Judgment/Partial Summary 
Judgment, defendants were placed on notice that plaintiffs intended to rely on a variety of 
collateral documents (renderings, blueprints, bonds, etc.) to show the alignment of the subject 
road. (Date: December 20, 2002). If that were not enough, at oral argument on the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, this position became abundantly clear. (Date: August 27, 2003). 
Because disqualifying Denver Snuffer from the case at bar would result in significant 
financial and tactical prejudice to D.J., and in light of Westbrook's untimely filing of its Motion to 




Pursuant to the discussion outlined above, this Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to 
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. Plaintiffs counsel is 
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instructed to prepare an order consistent with the findings contained herein. 
DATED this f " day of April, 2004. 
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